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A Dynamic Analysis of Adverse Selection
Carine Franca, b, Marc Perronninb, Aurélie Pierreb 
Abstract 
Adverse selection, which is well described in the theoretical literature on insurance, 
remains relatively difficult to study empirically. The traditional approach, which 
focuses on the binary decision of “covered” or “not”, potentially misses the main 
effects because heterogeneity may be very high among the insured. In the French 
context, which is characterized by universal but incomplete public health insurance 
(PHI), we study the determinants of the decision to subscribe to supplemental 
health insurance (SHI) in addition to complementary health insurance (CHI). This 
work permits to analyze health insurance demand at the margin. Using a panelized 
dataset, we study the effects of both individual state of health, which is measured by 
age and previous individual health spending, and timing on the decision to subscribe. 
One striking result is the changing role of health risk over time, illustrating that 
adverse selection occurs immediately after the introduction of SHI. After the initial 
period, the effects of health risks (such as doctors’ previous health expenditures) 
diminish over time and financial risks (such as dental and optical expenses and 
income) remain significant. These results may highlight the inconsistent effects of 
health risks on the demand for insurance and the challenges of studying adverse 
selection.
Keywords:  Supplemental  health  insurance,  adverse  selection,  health  insurance 
demand, longitudinal analysis.
Codes JEL: C23, D82, G22, I11.
a  Cermes, Inserm U988, CNRS UMR8211.
b  Irdes.
  The authors are grateful to Thomas Buchmueller, health economist researcher at the University of Michigan, 
for his helpful comments and his relevant suggestions.Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        2 
Subscribing to Supplemental Health Insurance in France: 
   A Dynamic Analysis of Adverse Selection
Résumé
Souscrire une assurance complémentaire en France :
une analyse dynamique de la sélection adverse
La sélection adverse est décrite de manière détaillée dans la littérature théorique sur 
l’assurance mais reste assez difficile à analyser d’un point de vue empirique. L’approche 
traditionnelle  consiste  à  se  focaliser  sur  le  choix  d’être  couvert  ou  non  couvert. 
Cependant, en ignorant l’hétérogénéité potentiellement forte au sein des assurés, cette 
approche peut éluder l’essentiel de la sélection adverse. Dans le contexte français, qui 
est caractérisé par l’existence d’une couverture assurantielle publique (PHI) universelle 
mais  incomplète,  nous  étudions  les  déterminants  de  la  décision  de  souscrire  une 
surcomplémentaire  santé  (SHI)  complétant  les  remboursements  d’un  contrat  de 
couverture complémentaire santé de base (CHI). Ce travail permet ainsi d’analyser la 
demande d’assurance à la marge. En utilisant des données panélisées, nous étudions 
l’effet de l’état de santé, mesuré par l’âge et par les dépenses de santé passées, et du 
temps dans la décision de souscrire la surcomplémentaire. Un résultat important est 
l’évolution au cours du temps du rôle du risque santé dans la décision de souscription, 
illustrant le fait que la sélection adverse survient immédiatement après l’introduction de 
la surcomplémentaire. Après la période de souscription, l’effet des variables de risque 
santé (telles que les dépenses passées en soins de médecins) diminuent au cours du 
temps alors que les variables de risque financier (telles que les dépenses en optique et en 
dentaire et le revenu) restent significatives. Ces résultats mettent en lumière  l’instabilité 
de l’effet du risque santé sur la demande d’assurance et donc le défi que représente 
l’analyse de la sélection adverse.
Mots-clefs : Surcomplémentaire santé, sélection adverse, demande d’assurance santé, 
analyse longitudinale.
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1.  Introduction
French health insurance system 
In France, the range of medical products and services covered by public health insurance 
(PHI) has always been very broad. However, there are copayments for any given service. 
Most statutory public copayments are computed as a percentage of the official tariff 
negotiated between PHI and the providers (for instance, 30% for outpatient visits, and 
65% for “convenience drugs”). Another source of patients’ out-of-pocket payments is 
the difference between the actual market price of a service and the official negotiated 
tariff (Buchmueller and Couffinhal 2004). This difference may be particularly high 
for some medical products (dental prostheses, eyewear), and for the services of some 
physicians who are allowed to charge patients more than the ceiling price and  PHI does 
not reimburse the statutory fee for hospitalization (18€ per diem in 2010).
Because public coverage is incomplete, more than 90% of citizens purchase complementary 
health insurance (CHI). The private contracts cover at least the copayments on the ceiling 
price and statutory fees for hospitalization anddepending on the contract, private insurance 
may also provide reimbursements for over-billings for eyewear, dental prostheses and 
physician care. Although in France, additional private insurance is not typically purchased 
to avoid public sector queues or for direct access to specific providers (as in countries such 
as Switzerland and the UK), private insurance plays an expanding role in financial access 
to healthcare. Indeed, the PHI’s share in healthcare funding has decreased significantly 
in recent decades mainly for outpatient care. Meanwhile, the proportion of healthcare 
financed by private insurance increased to 13.7% in 2008, and proportion of individuals 
with private insurance experienced a sharp increase from 70% in the early 1980s to 88% 
in 2008. In addition, 6% of individuals receive public complementary health insurance 
(CMUC, see Figure 1). Today, about half of the population obtains private health insurance 
through  employers  while  the  other  half  voluntarily  purchases  individual  insurance. 
Employer-provided contracts are community rated, so there is a perfect pooling between 
employees. In the individual market, insurers use several strategies to mitigate adverse 
selection. First, the premiums of most of contracts are age-adjusted, though health status 
is rarely taken into account (health questionnaires are usually prohibited for contracts that 
offer health guarantees). Moreover, insurers generally offer several levels of coverage, 
some of which impose an upper age limit1. A few non-profit “mutuelles” also provide a 
community rating contract and to attract low risk and avoid negative adverse selection. 
Finally, some other non-profit “mutuelles,” particularly those insuring civil servants, price 
the contracts in relation to the income of their beneficiaries.  
Theorical and empirical background on adverse selection 
A number of theoretical papers have analyzed health insurance demand and how it is 
affected by information asymmetries (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Arrow 1963). If 
insurers shared the same information as the insured about health and financial risks, 
they could charge a fair premium and people would opt for full coverage. Nevertheless, 
unlike the case of perfect competition, the insurer does not know the risk class of an 
1  A tax of 7% of the price of the contract incites insurers not to rate the contracts depending on individual health 
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individual or the treatment cost the individual is able to experiment. The first situation is 
problematic in the case of purely private voluntary insurance because it leads to adverse 
selection where insurers may apply a uniform premium that deters low risk to maintain 
coverage. This will result in a loss of utility to the non-insured, the non-fully-insured 
(assuming risk aversion), and to the insurer in comparison with a situation of perfect 
competition where risks are observable by the insurer. 
Chiappori et al. (2006) raised a crucial question for health insurance: is there evidence 
of relevant information asymmetries on risk? According to Arrow (1963), risk-averse 
individuals purchase insurance to cover the various financial risks associated with health 
care services including those associated with an unforeseen deterioration in health status 
and those associated with known diminished health status. Although some health care 
needs (eye care services) may be easily predicted due to their persistence and regularity 
of expenses, uncertainty remains about other health care needs. Moreover, insurers do 
not typically have information about the frequency of health care utilization. Thus, the 
degree of information asymmetry may vary depending on the health services and the 
intensity of the adverse selection phenomenon is not straightforward. 
In line with the theoretical results of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), individuals who 
voluntarily decide to purchase the most generous health insurance plans are typically 
found to have a higher-than-average health risk. Thus, there is a positive correlation 
between health risk and the level of health insurance coverage. Many studies have 
examined adverse selection in various countries. In their article on “The Anatomy of  
Health Insurance,” Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) summarized the main findings for the 
US. Some authors showed that demand for insurance is very sensitive to health status 
and health care utilization. Ellis (1989) analyzed healthcare plan choice in a large firm 
and found that individuals who choose the highest coverage are older and have higher 
health costs than those who choose basic plans. Similarly, Altman et al. (1998) found 
that individuals with heavy health care utilization have a higher propensity to switch 
from an HMO to an indemnity plan. 
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) and Cutler and Reber (1998), working, respectively, 
on the health plans of University of California and Harvard University employees, 
observed that the most generous options (PPOs) attracted only the sickest employees 
after employers decided to no longer compensate the price differential between plans.
However, individual health status does not appear as a significant and persistent factor 
in all studies. Ettner (1997) did not find a significant effect of health variables on the 
probability to purchase enhanced versus basic supplemental coverage (Medigap). Using 
semi-parametric analysis, Bajari et al. (2006) did not find significant differences in the 
latent self-assessed health distribution between the uninsured and various categories of 
the insured in the US (employer provided, individually purchased, and self employed). 
More  recently,  in  a  study  of  private  complementary  health  insurance  in  Australia, 
Buchmueller et al. (2008) found a negative correlation between the predicted probability 
of hospitalization and the probability of purchasing private hospital insurance. In 
France, studies such as those of Buchmueller et al. (2004) and Albouy and Crépon (2008) 
rejected the assumption of adverse selection in the decision to purchase complementary 
health insurance. 
Doiron et al. (2008) noted that two hypotheses have been advanced in the literature to 
justify the weakness or lack of the adverse selection effect. The first posits that insurers 
manage to favorably select customers, and the second argues that commonly-used 
measures of risk also capture variations in preferences, such as attitudes toward risk, Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        5 
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which may dominate the adverse selection effect. Doiron et al. (2008) and Buchmueller 
et al. (2008) provide results supporting the latter hypothesis. Moreover, as noted by 
Shokkaert et al. (2009), the institutional context plays a major role, particularly in terms 
of whether public health insurance is available so that private insurance only acts as a 
supplement, which is the case in France. 
Moreover, most studies that examine adverse selection consider the binary individual 
situation, where “covered” or “not covered” describes the individual decision due to the 
difficulty of collecting precise data on coverage levels. This approach does not examine 
determinants of the decision at the margin and may not provide information about 
selection between contracts. This is especially the case in the French context, where 
analysis of the decision to be insured/uninsured in the French context may be limited 
because only 6% to 7% of the population is uncovered by CHI. Thus, heterogeneity 
between covered  individuals  is  much  higher  than  between covered  and  uncovered 
individuals. Following the study of Shokkaert et al. (2009)2, we examine the case of the 
choice to subscribe to supplemental health insurance (SHI) in addition to CHI and PHI 
starting from a situation where all insured are initially covered by PHI and a uniform 
CHI (see Figure 1). Through longitudinal analysis, we examine the determinants of 
the decision to purchase SHI and we study particularly the effects of past health care 
expenditures while controlling for a set of socio-demographic characteristics. 
2.  Data and methods
Data context
To study adverse selection, we analyze the individual decision to buy SHI in addition 
to CHI, that was offered to the beneficiaries of a non-profit “mutuelle”(mainly civil 
servants and their relatives) from July 2003 to December 2005. Until mid-2003, the only 
offered contract was a pooling CHI with voluntary subscription. Individual premiums 
for the CHI depend on the civil servant salary alone. Any beneficiary of CHI had 
the opportunity to individually purchase SHI: within a household, only some of the 
individuals may decide to purchase SHI. 
Table 1 presents the different additional reimbursements, respectively, provided by PHI, 
CHI and SHI. Compared to the French individual insurance market 3, the CHI under 
study offered reimbursements for complex eyewear that were above the median but 
low reimbursements for basic eyewear and dental prostheses. As with the majority of 
individual contracts, the studied CHI did not reimburse extra-billing on physician’s fees. 
The copayments may limit adverse selection but also may not satisfy individuals with 
expensive health care or who are highly risk-averse. 
The SHI plan was community rated: the premium was set at 11€ per individual per month 
(0€ for the third child and beyond) and remained unchanged from the introduction to 
its removal at the end of 2005. 
2  The authors studied the effects of supplemental insurance at the margin in Belgium, where the system is based on 
a compulsory public system as it is in France. However, the supplemental insurance mainly covers extra billings 
applied to patients who opt for an individual room in a hospital.
3  See Couffinhal and Perronnin (2004) and Arnould et al. (2007).Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        6 
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The introduction of the SHI plan enables us to analyze how individuals respond to 
a change in the offer at the margin regarding their health, their income and other 
characteristics known to influence the demand for insurance. 
Available data
The dataset used was extracted from an administrative file of all beneficiaries of the 
pooled CHI between 2001 and 2005 (2.5 years before and after the introduction of 
SHI). For each individual, the dataset provides the decision of whether to purchase 
SHI  and,  in  the  case  of  subscription,  the  date  of  underwriting.  The  dataset  also 
provides a large number of individual socio-demographic characteristics: age, gender, 
administrative situation, residence, status of the insured (i.e. policyholder or eligible) 
and the CHI premium, which is determined from the policyholder’s wage through the 
national wage index. This last variable provides a proxy of household financial resources. 
The administrative file also contains a dataset that provides detailed information about 
individual health care expenses from 2001 to 2005. For each expense, we observe 
the date of utilization, the type of care (doctors’ fees, drugs, dental care, optical care, 
hospital care, etc.) and the entire cost of care that is reimbursed in part by PHI, CHI 
and SHI. The residual expenditure is borne by the user (copayment). 
This panelized dataset is a rich source of information that allows us to study health 
insurance demand from a dynamic perspective (step by step) and enables us to test 
adverse selection effects on the health insurance market over time.
Sample
Starting  from  a  population  of  over  100,000  households  living  in  the  French 
metropolitan  territory  and  representing  over  150,000  individuals,  we  were  able  to 
generate a representative sample of our population containing 18,126 individuals  4. 
Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the sample in 2005.
From July 2003 to December 2005, 20% of individuals subscribed to SHI: 73% subscribed 
in 2003, 19% in 2004 and 8% in 2005. Six months before the implementation of SHI, an 
information campaign was launched to educate CHI beneficiaries about SHI. This period 
enabled enrollees to calculate their marginal benefit of SHI. This may partly explain why 
most of the people who subscribed to SHI enrolled during the first semester. Furthermore, 
it is valid to assume that individuals who immediately enrolled are those with the best 
expectation of high expenditures or those who present a strong aversion to risk. 
Women represent 36.6% of our sample, even though women are 52% of the French 
population. This difference is due to our population, which consists of civil servants 
working in equipment and land management. Nonetheless, women are overrepresented 
among the SHI enrollees (40.6% among SHI enrollees versus 36.6% among the sample). 
On average, individuals in the sample are 49.6 years old, and those who purchased 
SHI are much older than those who did not (56.3 yrs versus 47.7 yrs). Our sample is 
characterized by a high proportion of retired persons (31.2% versus 20% in the French 
population), and retired persons are also overrepresented among the SHI enrollees. 
Two-thirds of the individuals are CHI policyholders, 14.8% are spouses and 19.6% are 
children. This last category (children) is heavily underrepresented among SHI enrollees.
4  Details are available upon request.Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        7 
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The majority of individuals (57.8%) belong to households whose gross income (of the 
policyholder) is between 1350€ and 1790€ per month; this population is underrepresented 
among SHI enrollees, whereas higher wage index brackets are overrepresented. Interestingly, 
the lowest wage bracket (lower than 1350€ per month) is also overrepresented among SHI 
enrollees. On average, we count 1.52 insured individuals on each CHI contract (average 
household size), and this number is lower among SHI enrollees.
Finally, the individual expenditure over the five semesters before the implementation of 
SHIis equal to 3440€ on average (i.e., 688€ per semester). Compared to other individuals, 
SHI enrollees have a higher average overall health care expenditure and higher average 
expenditure per health service, except for hospital care. 
Econometric model
We assume that individuals make a sequential choice of whether to purchase SHI over 
time: at each semester from July 2003 to December 2005, individuals make their choice 
conditional on not having been enrolled during the previous semesters. At each point 
in time, this decision is the result of the tradeoff between the price of SHI and the 
individual willingness to pay for this additional level of coverage. In our economic 
model, we assume that the willingness to pay increases with perceived health risk but 
also depends on other characteristics such as income. 
To  observe  the  dynamic  decision  to  subscribe,  we  run  a  sequential probit  model: 
we estimate the probability to purchase SHI at semester s conditional of not having 
purchased it earlier. Explanatory variables may be sorted into three groups: 
-  Individual health risk, measured by both the detailed health care expenditures (for 
each type of service) aggregated over the last past five semesters (prior s), and age 
and its combinations (squared and cubed age). 
-  The individual wage index as a proxy of household income. 
-  A set of covariates Xi  (that do not vary over time) to control the effects of variables 
explaining health insurance demand and to isolate the health risk and the income 
effect: gender, administrative situation, status of the insured, number of individuals 
on CHI contract and residence. 
Because the price is uniform we did not introduce price into the regressions5. With 
regard to these specifications, the econometric model is as follows:
To highlight the supplemental information from considering subscription over time, we 
run a “standard” model: we regress the dummy of covered/not covered by SHI at the 
end of the period on the individual characteristics (we consider the age at the end of 
2005) and the detailed health care expenditures aggregated from the first semester of 
2001 to the first semester of 2003.
5  Strictly speaking, the SHI premium may be null because the contract is free for the third enrolled child. Never-
theless, this situation pertains to less than 1% of our study population.Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        8 
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3.  Result 
We successively analyze the results of the standard model, which only considers the 
decision at the end of the period with the dummy “has decided to subscribe SHI” or 
“not,” and then, the sequential model, which considers the same decision at each period 
conditional upon previous non-subscription. All of the results are presented in Table 3. 
Health status proxies
Age plays an interesting and significant role regardless of the approach (standard or dynamic). 
Because of the cubic form, a graphic representation leads to a better interpretation of the 
effect of age (Graphs 1 and 2). Under the standard approach, age has a cubic impact on 
the demand for SHI. This result illustrates the known relationship between age and health 
care use: the risk to use health care is higher for young children than adults until the age 
of 30, then risk increases with increasing age until age 80 and finally decreases beyond 80 
(Graph 1). The decrease in health care costs that seems to appear after 80 years is because 
we consider all health care spending associated with the out-patient sector; aside from the 
per-diem fee (which corresponds to less than 5% of hospital costs), almost all hospital costs 
are paid directly by PHI. The same effect also appears in the dynamic approach, but mainly 
during the first period of the model (S2 2003). For the following periods, the effect of age 
becomes negative (Graph 2): thus, an older individual who has chosen not to subscribe 
during the first period (S2 2003), is less likely to buy SHI later than a younger individual.
Remind that past health expenditures are valued differently in the two models. In the standard 
model, past individual health expenditures are evaluated based on the health consumption 
observed during the five semesters preceding the introduction of SHI. In the dynamic 
model, the analysis is more precise because it assesses past health care spending over the 
five semesters preceding the decision to subscribe to SHI. Regardless of the approach, the 
significant effects are similar: higher health expenditure during a semester (i.e., a greater use 
of health care) increases the probability of purchasing SHI in the following semester.
The standard approach highlights high and significant effects of health expense items 
on which SHI provides a marked improvement in reimbursements and thus a marked 
decrease in out-of-pocket residual cost: doctors’ fees, optical care, dental care and 
other fees. In the dynamic approach, the same health expenditure items appear, but 
their respective impact on the decision to subscribe to SHI is not persistent over the 
time. The results of the dynamic approach for the first period are similar to those of 
the standard approach. For example, the items of doctors’ fees and optical and dental 
expenses over the past six months are determinants of subscribing to SHI in both 
models. During the following semesters, however, the same health expenditure items 
are significant but their respective effects seem to diminish, especially with regard to 
dental fees. For optical care, a person who has not yet purchased SHI is more likely to 
subscribe to SHI when past optical expenditures are high. Although the effect of this 
particular item diminishes over the semesters, it persists until the first half of 2005.
Income effect
In the standard model, we find the counterintuitive result that lower-paid workers are 
more likely to subscribe to SHI than those one wage ranges higher. There does not seem Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        9 
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to be any income effect on SHI subscription in the standard model. Thus, being highly-
paid does not seem to be a significant determinant of insurance demand in the standard 
model. Note that this result may also be caused by the fact that for the basic contract, 
premiums are computed according to the wage: the wealthier you are, the higher the 
premiums you pay. Thus, even if the premium of the SHI contract is uniform, the total 
cost of private health insurance (CHI + SHI) is higher for the richest.
For the first step of the dynamic approach, income has no effect. However, for the 
following periods, as with variables characterizing the health risk, the income effect 
appears to be similar to the one obtained in the standard model: during the second 
period, the lowest paid individuals are most likely to subscribe to SHI, although this 
effect is only significant for the lower wage classes (less than 1350 Euros per month). 
Other determinants 
Consistent with prior studies, gender is a significant determinant of health insurance 
demand. Whether the model is standard or dynamic, women have a significantly higher 
probability to opt for SHI than men. This effect is traditionally explained by adverse 
selection: women, who are known to consume more health care than men, anticipate 
higher health care consumption and subscribe to a higher level of insurance.
The probability to buy SHI decreases when the number of insured on the CHI contract 
increases. One interpretation of this finding is that when family size increases, covering 
the same with SHI as with CHI is costlier. This effect is very important in the standard 
model, but although it follows the same logic in the dynamic model, the effect appears 
to diminish over the time.
4.  Discussion
The dynamic approach, which was the major innovative contribution of this study, 
provides  additional  evidence  on  the  effects  of  variables  that  may  characterize  the 
impact of individual health status on health insurance demand. Because most enrollees 
subscribed immediately, results obtained in the first step of the dynamic approach 
are very similar to those obtained in the standard approach. The contribution of our 
research is that after considering early subscribers, who have a demand function that has 
already been described in previous studies, we observe new outcomes concerning the 
assumption of adverse selection. One striking result is the evolution of the influence of 
health variables on SHI subscription over time. 
Adverse selection occurs significantly and immediately after the implementation of 
SHI. Indeed, immediate subscription increases with age, health care expenditures of 
ambulatory care in general and for physicians’ care, optical care and dental care in 
particular. The influence of these types of expenses, for which SHI provides a very high 
additional reimbursement, reflects the traditional finding: expected health expenditures 
lead to a higher demand for health insurance coverage, which corresponds to the adverse 
selection phenomenon. Thus, the results obtained from the standard model and from 
the first period of the dynamic model are in line with those of Ellis (1989) and Altman 
et al. (1998): the effect of variables representing the insured individuals state of health 
(age and past health expenses) is significant and acts in the expected manner. Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        10 
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However, beginning with the second period in the dynamic model, adverse selection no 
longer seems to matter. The age and past health expenditures variables no longer have 
the same effect on the probability to purchase SHI. Doctors’ fees are still relevant in the 
second period following the introduction of SHI (S1 2004) (i.e., among those who had not 
yet subscribed to SHI, individuals who spent more on of doctors’ fees are more likely to 
subscribe). However, this effect disappears during all following semesters and only optical 
and, to a lesser extent, dental expenditures remain influential. The optical and dental items 
represent greater financial risks than health risks in the sense that their costs are generally 
known in advance. Thus, insured individuals who subscribed to SHI later probably do 
not know accurately their health risk aside from their optical care risk. Moreover, the 
weakness of adverse selection among late subscribers may reveal a high health insurance 
value regardless of health status, and thus reveal an important risk aversion as well. In 
fact, even if their risks do not reveal a real need for SHI, they choose to subscribe to it. 
The results obtained for the second and later periods in the dynamic model are more 
in line with the findings of Ettner (1997), Bajari et al. (2006), Buchmueller et al. (2004) 
and Albouy and Crépon (2008), who rejected the assumption of adverse selection in the 
decision to purchase complementary or supplementary health insurance.
Note that the choice of past health care spending before subscribing to SHI as a proxy of 
individual care needs merits discussion. Indeed, it is possible that some individuals, especially 
poor individuals, have had to forego care for financial reasons. In that case, past health care 
spending would underestimate health needs and therefore would bias the results on adverse 
selection.  Thus, adverse selection may not be as weak for later subscribers as it appears. 
Nevertheless, various arguments suggest that our assumptions and findings are valid. First, 
the age effect on the probability to subscribe becomes negative. In other words, the older 
an individual is, the less likely the individual is to subscribe to SHI. The age effect, which 
is known to be an observable risk factor strongly linked with health needs, supports the 
assumption of no adverse selection for later subscribers. Second, the income effect during 
the periods following the implementation of SHI (beginning with the semester S1 2004) also 
supports our interpretation: the lowest paid employees are more willing to subscribe to SHI. 
As previously noted, these subscriptions also result from the anticipation of known and high 
expenses, which take up a greater share of household budgets when income is low. Clearly, 
lower-paid employees are more willing to purchase SHI, which can be explained by a greater 
absolute risk aversion. Nevertheless, they differ in the timing of their subscription to SHI 
due to the weight of the price of SHI in their budget.
Another limitation of our model is that we analyze individuals insured by a particular 
provider. We assume that the particularity of our sample mainly affects the income 
variable in that the wages of civil servants benefit from a specific method of payments 
and that the variability of wages is lower than in the private sector. Therefore, we 
assume that the results concerning income are probably very specific to our study 
sample. Note that the results discussed above concerning adverse selection may not be 
strongly affected by this specificity if civil servants do not differ substantially from the 
population as a whole in terms of health expenditures or unobservable characteristics 
(such as risk aversion) linked with the decision to purchase health insurance and the 
observable variables. However, civil servants may have chosen to work for the public 
sector due to its safety (from unemployment), which could imply a higher risk aversion.
Due to our dynamic approach, we are able to highlight a unique result: the effects of 
health risks on insurance demand (for supplemental insurance in our study) diminish 
over time. It is interesting to note that those health expenses that constitute a greater 
financial risk (dental and optical expenses) remain significant over time, while pure Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        11 
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health risk does not. This finding appears to be particularly true in the French context, 
where the financial risks associated with optical and dental care (statutory copayments) 
are rather high.  Access to these types of care requires assistance from complementary 
health insurance, particularly for the poorest. This reason is why the government has 
provided a contract for complementary insurance for the poorest individuals since 2000. 
5.  Conclusion
This study makes several contributions to our understanding of the effect of health 
risk and income on the demand for SHI in a context where basic health insurance is 
provided. The study analyzes the demand for a marginal increase in coverage among 
individuals already insured by a uniform basic CHI contract. Our results are consistent 
with those from previous studies because we emphasized the significant role of rather 
well-known determinants of health insurance demand, such as gender, income, health 
risk that is approximated by both age and individual past health spending. 
However, our dynamic approach allows us to better understand how these determinants affect 
the demand for insurance. In this sense, the results we obtain from the sequential model differ 
from those of previous studies that typically compared the binary situation of “covered”/“not 
covered” by a CHI. These traditional studies found a positive effect of income but no consistent 
effect of health status or health risks on the demand for insurance. In our study, the decision to 
subscribe to SHI appears to depend strongly on individual health risk and weakly on income. 
By analyzing sequences conditional on an individual not having previously purchased SHI, 
we are able to emphasize the results of previous studies: during the first period, the effect of 
the insured individual’s state of health is significant and acts in the expected manner (Ellis, 
1989 and Altman et al., 1998), but from the second period, this effect tends to diminish until 
it disappears (Ettner 1997, Bajari et al. 2006, Buchmueller et al., 2004 and Albouy and Crépon 
2008), and an income effect appears and get stronger over the periods.
Thus, this research provides important information on the decision process to subscribe 
to SHI over time. People who purchase the contract immediately seek to cover health risks 
(corresponding to adverse selection), whereas later enrollees are more likely to cover a financial 
risk (past optical spending). These later enrollees are also characterized by low income. Thus, 
their demand for SHI coverage seems to be governed by a higher risk aversion, but they may 
have postponed their enrollment as their likely postponement of previous health expenses.
These results illustrate the dynamic of effects that may exist in the demand for health 
insurance by describing the interactions between different effects. Doiron et al. (2008) 
proposed two hypotheses to justify the weak or nonexistent of adverse selection effect. 
Our results allow us to formulate an alternative hypothesis to explain the inconsistency 
of the health effect on the insurance demand and the difficulty of models to highlight 
adverse selection. Indeed, a study of adverse selection over a period of one year in our 
analysis does not provide the same results that an analysis over a longer period. While in 
the first period, health risk dominates all other effects, income effects are important in 
later periods, and the effect of health status is greatly reduced over time. 
Our work clearly shows that health insurance demand is specific to each level of 
guarantees. In fact, individuals are sensitive to the range of coverage that is offered 
and to rating practices. Further study would analyze health insurance choices among a 
continuous range of coverage to understand how health insurance demand is structured 
according to the level of coverage. Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                        12 
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Table 1: PHI, Pooling CHI and SHI: warranties for different types 
of health care expenses
 
Health services PHI CHI SHI
Physician care (consulta￿ons/visits/medical acts)  70% of CP 30% of CP + 30% of CP
Dental care
     preserva￿ve den￿stry 70% of CP 30% of CP /
     dental prostheses / orthodon￿a 70 % of CP 115% of CP + 135% of CP
Other fees (sugerical acts, radiology procedures) 70% of CP 30% of CP + 30% of CP
Prescrip￿on drugs
     white vigne￿e drugs 65% of CP 35% of CP /
     blue vigne￿e drugs 35% of CP 65% of CP /
Op￿cal
     eyeglasses  65% of CP 865% to 900% of CP  + 31€ to + 92€
     frame  65% of CP 55 € + 61€
     contact lenses 0 € 115 € +115€
Other prescrip￿ons (auxiliary care, laboratory procedure, orthopedia)  60% of CP 40% of CP  /
Hospitaliza￿ons
    Hospitals that have not concluded RHF agreement:
        medical prac￿￿onners fees 80% or 100% of CP 20% or 0% of CP + 30% of CP
        stay costs 80% or 100% of CP 20% or 0% of CP  /
        per diem copayment (10€ for psychatric hospitaliza￿on and 14€ otherwise)  / Full reimb  /
     Hospitals that have concluded the RFH agreement (all kind of cost) negociated tariﬀ negociated tariﬀ negociated tariﬀ
Other types of care
     Medical transporta￿on 65% of CP 35% of CP  /
     Spa care 65% or 70% of CP 35% of 30% of CP  /  
Note: CP = Social security ceiling price 
White/Blue vigne‡e : indicator permiˆng drug classiﬁcaŠon. White vigne‡e denotes medical uŠlity drugs. Blue vigne‡e denotes moderate
medical uŠlity drugs         
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Table 2: Sample characteristics in 2005
  Full sample
covered by the 
SHI
not covered by 
the SHI
Age 49.5 56.3 47.7
Gender
Man 62.6% 59.4% 63.4%
Woman 37.4% 40.6% 36.6%
wage index brackets (in points)
<= 1350€ 6.1% 7.5% 5.7%
From 1350€ to 1790€ 57.8% 51.9% 59.3%
From 1790€ to 2240€ 20.5% 22.6% 19.9%
From 2240€ to 3110€ 10.2% 11.6% 9.8%
> 3110€ 5.5% 6.5% 5.2%
administrative situation
Active 40.1% 43.7% 39.1%
Retired 31.2% 38.5% 29.3%
Student 1.5% 0.9% 1.6%
Without professional activity 27.3% 16.9% 29.9%
family situation
SHI policyholder 65.6% 76.0% 63.0%
Spouse 14.8% 16.7% 14.3%
Child 19.6% 7.3% 22.8%
residential location (grouping of regions)
Ile-de-France (IdF = Paris region) 7.8% 10.4% 7.1%
Parisian basin regions (excluded IdF) 16.8% 15.1% 17.3%
Northern regions 4.4% 4.5% 4.4%
Eastern regions: Alsace-Lorraine 6.0% 9.2% 5.2%
Eastern regions: Franche-Comté 2.6% 2.6% 2.6%
Western regions 16.9% 12.7% 18.0%
Southwestern regions  15.4% 15.6% 15.3%
Center-Eastern regions 11.7% 12.8% 11.5%
Mediterranean regions 14.3% 13.1% 14.6%
sum of health care expenditures from January 1st, 2001 to June 30th 2003
Entire expenditure 3 440 €    4 027 €      3 288 € 
Physician care 408 €          500 €    384 € 
Dental care 319 €          380 €      303 € 
Other fees 247 €        317 €          228 € 
Prescription drugs  1 006 €       1 277 €  936 € 
Optical care  159 €       203 €  147 € 
Other prescriptions 518 €        568 €  506 € 
Hospital care  666 €     661 €   668 € 
Other types of care 118 €   121 €   117 € 
Number of observations 18126 8668 9458
Number of pooled CHI policies 12173 6780 5393
Average number of beneficiaries per pooled CHI policy 1.52 1.42 1.56Document de travail n° 35 - IRDES - Décembre 2010                                         
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Table 3: Determinants of the decision to buy the SHI
  Standard model Dynamic model 














Gender and Age 
Man ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Woman  4.467*** 3.378*** 0.851*** 0.334** 0.179* 0.234**
Age -2.139*** -0.933*** -0.289** -0.176*** -0.202*** -0.197***










<= 1350€ ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
From 1350€ to 1790€ -5.190*** n.s. -2.003*** -0.829*** -1.142*** -0.573**
From 1790€ to 2240€ n.s. n.s. 0.98** -0.440** -0.688*** -0.316*
From 2240€ to 3110€ n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.674*** -0.667*** n.s. 
> 3110€ n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.515** -0.601*** -0.477***
Professional activity of policyholder
Working policyholder ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Retired -4.222*** -2.922*** -0.833*** -0.235* -0.224* -0.194*
Student 71.312*** n.s. n.s. 8.736** n.s. 48.331*
Policyholder’s spouse - 4.351*** -2.799*** -1.140*** -0.306* n.s. n.s.
Policyholder’s child  -15.638*** n.s. -2.107*** -1.685*** -1.467*** -1.470***
Number of insured by CHI -2.445*** -1.815*** -0.336** -0.128* -0.158** n.s.
Past health care expenses (per 100€)
Physician care 0.441*** 0.365*** 0.078*** n.s. n.s. n.s.
Dental care  0.143*** 0.136*** 0.03* n.s. 0.011* n.s.
Other fees  0.148* n.s. n.s. 0.028*** n.s. n.s.
Prescription drugs  n.s. n.s. -0.016* n.s. n.s. n.s.
Optical care 0.505*** 0.34*** 0.138*** 0.029* 0.025* n.s.
Other prescriptions -0.0473* n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Hospital care  n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.003* n.s. n.s.
Other types of care n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Prob. of enrollment of the 
average individual 0.1876 0.1289 0.0274 0.0102 0.0077 0.0067
Observed rate of enrollment 0.2051 0.1497 0.0328 0.0133  0.0108 0.0098
Number of subscribers 
(unweighted) 8,668 3,676 1,987 1,150 953 902
Number of observations 18,126 18,126 14,450 12,463 11,313 10,360
Standard model: probability to be covered by SHI on December 31st, 2005.
Dynamic model: for each semester, probability to subscribe to SHI conditional on not having previously subscribed.
In the dynamic model, for each year, S1= first semester     S2 = second semester
dprob/dx measures the marginal effect on the probability to buy SHI. Variations in the probability are expressed in points: A 
marginal effect of 4.467 pts indicates that the probability to buy SHI increase by 0.0467.
An individual who had medical expense fees of 100 € more than that of a reference individual has a 0.441 points higher probability 
of having subscribed to SHI at the end of 2005.
*** denotes  significance at the 0.1% level  ** denotes significance at the 1% level * denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Subscribing to Supplemental Health Insurance in France:
A Dynamic Analysis of Adverse Selection
Carine Franc (Cermes, Inserm U988, CNRS UMR8211, Irdes), Marc Perronnin (Irdes), Aurélie Pierre (Irdes)
Adverse selection, which is well described in the theoretical literature on insurance, remains relatively difficult 
to study empirically. The traditional approach, which focuses on the binary decision of “covered” or “not”, 
potentially misses the main effects because heterogeneity may be very high among the insured. In the French 
context,  which  is  characterized  by  universal  but  incomplete  public  health  insurance  (PHI),  we  study  the 
determinants of the decision to subscribe to supplemental health insurance (SHI) in addition to complementary 
health insurance (CHI). This work permits to analyze health insurance demand at the margin. Using a panelized 
dataset, we study the effects of both individual state of health, which is measured by age and previous individual 
health spending, and timing on the decision to subscribe. One striking result is the changing role of health 
risk over time, illustrating that adverse selection occurs immediately after the introduction of SHI. After the 
initial period, the effects of health risks (such as doctors’ previous health expenditures) diminish over time and 
financial risks (such as dental and optical expenses and income) remain significant. These results may highlight 
the inconsistent effects of health risks on the demand for insurance and the challenges of studying adverse 
selection.
Souscrire une assurance complémentaire en France :
une analyse dynamique de la sélection adverse
Carine Franc (Cermes, Inserm U988, CNRS UMR8211, Irdes), Marc Perronnin (Irdes), Aurélie Pierre (Irdes)
La sélection adverse est décrite de manière détaillée dans la littérature théorique sur l’assurance mais reste 
assez difficile à analyser d’un point de vue empirique. L’approche traditionnelle consiste à se focaliser sur le 
choix d’être couvert ou non couvert. Cependant, en ignorant l’hétérogénéité potentiellement forte au sein des 
assurés, cette approche peut éluder l’essentiel de la sélection adverse. Dans le contexte français, qui est caractérisé 
par l’existence d’une couverture assurantielle publique (PHI) universelle mais incomplète, nous étudions les 
déterminants de la décision de souscrire une surcomplémentaire santé (SHI) complétant les remboursements 
d’un contrat de couverture complémentaire santé de base (CHI). Ce travail permet ainsi d’analyser la demande 
d’assurance à la marge. En utilisant des données panélisées, nous étudions l’effet de l’état de santé, mesuré par 
l’âge et par les dépenses de santé passées, et du temps dans la décision de souscrire la surcomplémentaire. Un 
résultat important est l’évolution au cours du temps du rôle du risque santé dans la décision de souscription, 
illustrant le fait que la sélection adverse survient immédiatement après l’introduction de la surcomplémentaire. 
Après la période de souscription, l’effet des variables de risque santé (telles que les dépenses passées en soins 
de médecins) diminuent au cours du temps alors que les variables de risque financier (telles que les dépenses en 
optique et en dentaire et le revenu) restent significatives. Ces résultats mettent en lumière  l’instabilité de l’effet 
du risque santé sur la demande d’assurance et donc le défi que représente l’analyse de la sélection adverse.